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Border Tax Adjustments: A feasible way to address  
nonparticipation in Emission Trading  
 
Roland Ismer and Karsten Neuhoff 1 
 
CO2 emission certificates internalise effects of fossil fuel consumption on global climate and 
sea levels. If they are only implemented in some countries, then their effectiveness is limited; 
Consumption, production and investment decisions do not reach the optimal allocation, 
production with inefficient technologies in non-participating countries can even be increased. 
Furthermore industry lobbying might result in limited application of CO2 emission certificates 
or less ambitious reduction targets.  
Border tax adjustment at the level of additional costs incurred for procurement of CO2 
emission permits during production of processed materials using best available technology 
limits the distortions. We show that it can be compatible with WTO constraints. Crucial 
features of a practicable implementation are simplicity achieved by a focus on the CO2 
emissions caused by processed materials and a separate treatment of electric energy input to 
take account of regionally varying fuel mixes. 
1. Introduction 
 
The European Union has recently adopted a directive obliging the member states to introduce 
greenhouse gas emissions certificates.2 From January 1st 2005, certain business activities3 leading to 
emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) will require permits for these emissions.4 The permits contain the 
obligation of the business to hand over allowances covering the emissions within four months 
following the end of the calendar year.5 The allowances, which are freely tradable within the Union6, 
will mostly be allocated to the businesses free of charge.7 A small part of at first 5 per cent, rising to 
ten per cent by 2008 can be sold to the businesses if the individual member state so chooses.8 The 
directive aims to implement the obligations under the Kyoto Protocol, according to which the 
European Union has to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 8 percent by 2008 to 2012 relative to 
the 1990 levels. 
 
                                                 
1
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2
 DIRECTIVE 2003/83/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a 
scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 
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3
 Cf. Annex I of the directive. 
4
 Art. 4 of the directive. 
5
 Art. 6 para 2 (e) of the directive. 
6
 Art. 12 of the directive. 
7
 Art. 10, first sentence of the directive. 
8
 Art. 10, second sentence of the directive. 
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However, the US as the biggest CO2-emitter has decided not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. This raises 
concerns as to the unequal treatment of producers in the developed Kyoto countries, among them the 
European Union, and the US. Whereas the former have to incur the costs of CO2-abatement plus 
whatever carbon charges are in place, the latter do not suffer that burden. Both equity and an 
efficiency consideration result. First, it might appear unfair that European producers have to compete 
at an unequal footing, which would mean their profits would be lower. Second, the unevenness of the 
playing field threatens to at least partially defeat the purpose of the introduction of emission 
certificates. Energy efficient and therefore low CO2 intensive production in participating countries 
might be replaced by less energy efficient production in non-participating countries.  
 
Border tax adjustments (BTA)9 can contribute towards mitigating these problems. A border tax 
adjustment consists of the imposition of a charge on imported products correspondig to a tax borne by 
like domestic products and the exemption from or remission of taxes on products when they are 
exported.10 In practice, this means that exporters from the European Union will get charges they 
incurred at least partially refunded. Importers, on the contrary, will face a tax payable on entering the 
Union.11  
 
This paper will propose a system of border tax adjustments. The suggested taxes imposed at the border 
and the charges refunded seek to mirror those that would have arisen when producing the product in 
the Union. In practice, due to information constraints, this is not directly possible. However, we shall 
argue there is an indirect – albeit admittedly less efficient – way. The lower bound of emissions 
embodied in a product can be estimated by determining the different quantities of raw materials 
employed in its production multiplied respectively by the emissions in production per unit of that 
particular raw material. Such a scheme would have the advantage of conducing participants to reveal 
information: Producers from abroad would argue for an advanced (i.e. low emissions per unit) level 
whereas domestic producers would profit from a less advanced (i.e. high emissions) level. It could 
therefore be expected that the body entrusted with the determination of emissions per unit of raw 
material would dispose of sufficient information for fulfilling its task. To protect the decision process 
from domestic lobbying, the independence of that body should be safeguarded. A slightly different 
                                                 
9
 In the context of emissions trading certificates, it might appear slightly more appropriate to speak of border 
adjustment taxes rather than border tax adjustments. For, strictly speaking, there are no taxes that needed to be 
adjusted. Rather, taxes are the instrument, to adjust for the internal charges. However, the term border tax 
adjustment is by far more common and shall be employed here. 
10
 Demaret/Stewardson, Border Tax Adjustments under GATT and EC Law and General Implications for 
Environmental Taxes, JWT 28:4, 1994, p. 5 – 65, p. 2. See also the equivalent but slightly more technical 
definition in GATT Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments 1970, para. 4. 
11
 Such a system is currently in force for VAT: For example, a tourist from Austria travelling to Switzerland and 
buying a computer there, will on purchase have to pay Swiss VAT. When she leaves the region she can claim an 
reimbursement of Swiss VAT, but will have to pay import tax when entering the Austria with a tax rate equal to 
that of Austrian VAT. Hence, the decision for the Austrian consumer whether to buy in Austria or in Switzerland 
should be unaffected by differences in VAT between the countries. 
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approach has to be adopted for electricity input however. There, the price increase due to the 
introduction of the emissions trading scheme per kWh multiplied by the electricity consumed in 
production with best available technology should be adopted. 
 
The paper will argue that such a scheme would preserve the potentially huge benefits for the 
participants which trade liberalisation can bring about, where properly applied. It would be in 
compliance with World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules. If this were not the case, border tax 
adjustments could trigger countervailing measures. It would also be sufficiently clear and simple to 
ban the sprectres of disguised protectionist intentions and of political meddling, which would threaten 
the benefits from trade liberalisation. Ensuring WTO legality however comes at a price: To be on the 
safe side, the paper will propose a scheme, which incorporates two concessions. First, it will suggest 
an adjustment for the costs of certificates corresponding to production with best available technology 
only and not with average technology. And secondly, using the indirect method, which considers only 
basic materials employed in production means that subsequent energy inputs are not adjusted for.  
 
This proposal stands in contrast to much of the existing literature. It has largely focused on 
adjustments for ecological taxation, i.e. adjustments for taxes rather than for other charges. Where 
border tax adjustments for CO2 emissions trading schemes are discussed, they are frequently perceived 
as either potentially illegal12 or as posing formidable technical difficulties. In particular, the need to 
identify the appropriate carbon contents embodied in traded goods where exporting countries are 
unwilling to cooperate in the certification of production methods has been considered to be 
insurmountable.13 
 
It seems worthwhile mentioning that border tax adjustments are intertwined with allocation rules for 
the emission certificates in two significant ways. The current EU framework provides initially for 
partially free allocation of emission certificates, thereby reducing the average costs incurred by 
European producers. It is a temporary instrument mainly aimed at reducing the impact of emission 
trading on industry. Free allocation creates significant distortions and negative distributional effects 
and should therefore be totally phased out as soon as possible. Border tax adjustments firstly should 
allow for an accelerated phase-out schedule as they limit the negative effects of implementation CO2 
emission certificates for industry in regions with emission trading. Second, if grandfathered emission 
certificates are perceived under WTO law as part of the emission certificates scheme and not as lump 
sum payments to buy of industry opposition, then grandfathered emission certificates reduce the 
                                                 
12
 Cf. Daniel C. Esty, Greening the GATT – Trade, Environment and the Future, 1994 at 168 on a proposed 
introduction of US border tax adjustments. However, as he points out, these adjustments would have to be seen 
in the context of far higher energy taxes in Japan and Europe. He proposes a system of giving credit for 
comparable foreign charges and taxes. 
13
 Erik Denters, Free Riders in the Combat against Climate Change. Claims and Countermeasures, p. 15, 
available atwww.xs4all.nl/denters/publications; Zhong Xiang Zhang, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading and the 
World Trading System, JWT 32(5): 219-239 at 231. 
     4 
average costs industry faces from the emission certificate scheme. Only the average costs incurred by 
industry can be imposed as border taxes, therefore grandfathering could reduce the level and hence the 
effectiveness of border taxes. 
 
 
 
The paper contains the following section. Section two describes the productive and allocative 
inefficiencies of implementing emission certificates only in one region and shows how border tax 
adjustments can mitigate these effects. Section three analyses the restrictions on the optimal solution 
set by international law and in particular GATT. Section four and five addresses technical questions 
concerning the implementation and conclude. 
 
2. The Economic Case for BTA 
Overwhelming scientific evidence demonstrates that CO2 emissions change the global climate and 
lead to adverse effects for humankind as a whole.14 Yet when making consumption or production 
choices agents typically do not weigh the negative effect of their decisions on other people 
sufficiently. They are therefore likely to cause and in turn also to suffer from the consequences of 
excessive CO2 emission. CO2 emissions certificates seek to provide a remedy for this problem. They 
are designed so as to expose producers and consumers to the costs their decision to emit CO2 has on 
other humans, or in other words, they seek to internalise the negative externality in their decision.  
 
In theory, this can be achieved quite easily: If the future damage caused by climate change were 
known, then we would simply have to make anyone emitting CO2 to bear this cost. This would ensure 
optimal production and consumption decisions. However, in practice, uncertainty about future costs 
and political pressure by groups, which anticipate losing from the redistribution of tax burden, delay 
this process. This can give rise to situation where only some countries implement CO2 emission 
certificates. This raises the questions whether this partial implementation reduces the effectiveness of 
that measure and if so, whether BTA can help to restore some of the efficiency in such a case.   
 
The first question can be answered with the assistance of a brief economic model. Assume several 
technologies are available to transform energy into a product. Technologies only differ in their energy 
efficiency, in the amount of energy required to produce one unit of the product. This is a simplified 
model that only looks at the first order effects of energy and assumes that production is similar with 
regard to all other production factors. In the dynamic analysis we will furthermore assume that 
different technologies differ in their investment costs. This does not affect the static analysis, because 
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 IPCC synthesis report 2001. 
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investment costs are sunk at the time of production decisions. Assume all technologies are present in 
two regions USA and Europe and the product can be traded without costs between these regions. We 
assume perfectly competitive demand, supply and arbitrage. We furthermore assume that the markets 
are in equilibrium, such that production, trade and consumption can be assumed to occur 
simultaneously. Without border adjustment taxes, prices are therefore equal in both regions.  
 
Static analysis 
 
In the first step, we present a static analysis assessing the utilisation of existing production facilities.  
 
We first show that global implementation of Carbon Emission Certificates results in optimal 
production and consumption decisions. Production costs increase by the cost of emission certificates. 
Producers with the least efficient production technologies require the most emission certificates per 
unit of output and incur the highest cost increase. Consumers will reduce their demand if prices 
increase. Hence, the least efficient firm will not produce. Introduction of CO2 emission certificates 
therefore increases price and weakly reduces production in both regions relative to a scenario without 
emission certificates (Equation (3) and (4) in Appendix). The new production and allocation is 
efficient, because all externalities are internalised in the decision process. The analysis ignores 
uncertainty about future technologies and emission targets and learning externalities. If resulting 
dynamic effects are considered, then it is likely that under an optimal CO2 reduction policy CO2 
emission certificates are complemented with other measures.  
 
Now assume partial implementation without border tax adjustment. What happens relative to a 
scenario without emission certificates? Producers in region Europe are required to obtain emission 
certificates. Production costs increase in region Europe. The least efficient producers in region Europe 
will reduce output. A reduction in supply increases prices and results in lower consumption in both 
regions and higher production in region USA. In the full implementation scenario supply is also 
reduced in region USA, therefore the price increase is larger in the full implementation scenario 
(Proposition 3 in Appendix). Price increases induce consumption reductions. Partial implementation 
reduces consumption but not to the efficient level achieved with full implementation. Partial 
implementation also results in inefficient production decisions: In region Europe cost increases at the 
same level as under full implementation but the product price increases by less than under full 
implementation. Thus, production in region Europe with partial implementation is not only lower than 
under no implementation, but even lower than under full implementation. Partial implementation 
results not only in output reductions of inefficient firms but also in output reductions of some efficient 
firms (Proposition 1 in Appendix). This contrasts to region USA, where higher prices at constant costs 
result in increased output quantities and therefore imply that even technologies that are inefficient 
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under no-implementation will be used for production (Proposition 2 in Appendix). Production with 
inefficient technologies can reduce part or potentially all of the welfare gains from adjusting 
consumption towards the optimal level achieved under full implementation. People in both regions 
will suffer from the excessive emissions. Partial implementation without border tax adjustment might 
in some energy intensive industries with strong global competition contribute little to a reduction of 
global CO2 emissions.  
 
Now assume partial implementation with border tax adjustments at the level of best available 
technology. It works as follows: Whenever a product is imported into Europe the importer has to pay a 
tax corresponding to the costs the most efficient producer in Europe incurs for emission certificates. 
BTA improve both the static and the dynamic efficiency of the emission certificates and have 
favourable political economy implications. The exact effect of an emission certificates scheme with 
BTA can again be analysed with the help of the above model. This is a special case of Grossman’s 
analysis of BTA, which is non-distorting, if a ‘stage of processing’ value added tax (1980). 
 
Partial implementation with border tax adjustment in Europe can result in an increase or decrease of 
production in the USA relative to no emission certificates, dependent on the demand and technology 
(Proposition 4 in Appendix). This is the result of two countervailing effects: Demand is reduced – 
therefore global production is reduced and all producers are affected. If demand is very price 
responsive in Europe, then the global demand reduction is the dominant effect and producers in the 
USA will face lower output levels.  
 
However, producers in region Europe pay a weakly higher cost for the emission certificates than 
producers in region USA pay for the border adjustment tax at the level of best available technology. If 
dispersion of efficiencies between technologies is high then this effect dominates and producers in the 
USA benefit from the partial implementation with border tax adjustment and their output is increased. 
 
As the impact on producers in the USA can be ambivalent, it is of interest to see, whether partial 
implementation with border tax adjustment can be seen as a means of reducing market share of US 
producers. This would be the case if US producers not only had to reduce their production relative to 
no emission certificates, but if a wider range of US production technologies would turn inefficient than 
European production technologies under the implementation of emission certificates with border tax 
adjustment. Proposition 5 in the Appendix shows, that given typical assumptions on well-behaved 
demand functions this is not the case. Therefore partial implementation with border tax adjustment 
does not “discriminate” against US producers. 
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Dynamic Efficiency 
 
Under partial implementation of CO2 emission certificates without border adjustment taxes, 
investment in production in Europe is reduced in our stylised model relative to both no 
implementation and full implementation. Emission certificates increases the production costs by more 
than the rise in market price, therefore investment options which were previously profitable might no 
longer be profitable. In contrast, in the USA production costs stay constant but price increases. This 
will result in additional investment in the USA. The shift of production from Europe to the USA 
results in costly, and therefore inefficient re-allocation of production and labour from Europe to the 
USA with subsequent product flows from the USA to Europe. 
 
Investors face a trade off between low investment costs coupled with high energy costs for inefficient 
machines and high investment costs for efficient technology coupled with low energy costs. CO2 
emission certificates increase energy costs and therefore shift the balance towards more energy 
efficient technologies. However, investment in the USA is not affected by emission certificates. 
Investors shifting investment from Europe to the USA will invest in weakly less energy efficient 
technology than they would have used in Europe. Therefore lack of border adjustment taxes can 
eliminate a large proportion of the dynamic effect of emission certificates to ensure investment in 
energy efficient technologies. This effect might be compensated by technology spill over from Europe 
to the USA of more efficient technologies deployed under the higher energy costs. 
  
Emission certificates with border tax adjustment retain the incentive for companies to invest in 
Europe, even in energy intensive sectors, and therefore ensure that energy efficient technologies are 
used. 
One challenge of border tax adjustment is to set an appropriate level of taxes, which will be discussed 
in the section 4 on the implementation. To achieve dynamic efficiency it has to be ensured that  
individual companies do not influence the level of border adjustment taxes. If an individual company, 
by applying a more energy efficient technology in Europe, would define a new best available 
technology, then this company might be reluctant to invest in this technology. The new best available 
technology would reduce the level of border-tax adjustment and thereby lower the price the company 
would receive for its products in Europe. The issue can be avoided if best available technology 
requires a certain market share of the technology and covers several related products, such that any 
individual company decision is marginal. 
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Political Economy Implications 
 
In most countries it is unclear which sectors of population and industry will directly benefit from the 
implementation of carbon emission certificates. Therefore we observe strong political lobbying by 
potential losers against the implementation. In Europe particularly energy intensive industry argues 
that the unilateral implementation of CO2 emission certificates will result in moves to other locations. 
Such arguments either result in exclusion of industry sector from the emission scheme or prevent 
politicians to adopt targets that would imply significant levels of CO2 emission prices. However, with 
border tax adjustment the competitive disadvantage of European industry is compensated for, such that 
more ambitious CO2 reduction targets can be realised and emission certificate schemes can be 
implemented with fewer loop holes and at lower transaction costs if they do not require special clauses 
for several industrial sectors. 
 
In the United States the unilateral implementation of emission certificates in Europe creates 
benefits for industry. Therefore the lobbying efforts of special interest groups against 
emission certificates in the US might increase after implementation of emission certificates in 
Europe. If border adjustment taxes are applied in Europe, then the profits from higher prices 
and sales volume for US industry from Europe wide emission certificates should decrease. 
Lobby activities of US industry to retain these benefits will be reduced and the US will be 
more likely to implement policies to reduce CO2 emissions.  
 
3. International Law as a Restriction of the Policy Space 
 
Probably the major restriction under international law comes from WTO/GATT.15 This treaty is 
binding on the members, to which group both the European Community and its individual member 
states belong. Any breach of the obligations can give rise to a dispute settlement procedure before the 
WTO panel as the first and the appellate body as the second instance.16 While the “court” itself has no 
direct means of enforcing its ruling, it can ultimately grant the applicant state permission to impose 
trade sanctions on imports from the other state, which violated its obligations under GATT. These 
                                                 
15
 On this see in particular the seminal article by Demaret/Stewardsson, fn. 10. Cf. also Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann, International Trade Law and International Environmental Law: Environmental Taxes and Border 
Tax Adjustment in WTO Law and EU Law, in: Revesz/Sands/Stewart (eds.), Environmental Law, the Economy 
and Sustainable Development, Cambridge University Press, 2000; Christian Pitschas, GATT/WTO Rules for 
Border Tax Adjustment and the Proposed European Directive Introducing a Tax on Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
and Energy, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 24 (1994), 479-500; Marco Düerkopf, Trade 
an Environment: International Trade Law Aspects of the Proposed EC Directive Introducing a Tax on Carbon  
Dioxide Emissions and Energy, Common Market Law Review 1994, 807-844.  
16
 For this see the 1994 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (in the 
following this is abbreviated as DSU). 
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sanctions can, without in turn triggering countermeasures, be maintained until the other state ceases its 
infraction.17  
 
The restriction should not be brushed aside by simply arguing that border tax adjustments would be 
introduced so that the EU could fulfill its obligation under the Kyoto Protocol as a multilateral 
environmental agreement (MEA).18 For the relationship between MEAs and GATT is far from clear.19 
In general, the implications of the MEA on the obligations under GATT depend on whether both states 
in question are party to the MEA. Where they both are, it can be reasonably argued that the obligations 
under GATT between the two states are altered by the MEA.20 However, where one state is not a 
member, it seems far more difficult to reason that the obligations under GATT are changed. Just as 
under ordinary contract law, treaties generally apply only between the parties (res inter alios acta 
tertiis nec nocet nec prodest, Art. 35 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). The case of 
the US as the main non-participant industrialised country refusing to sign up to the Kyoto Protocol 
presents additional difficulties: The US has signed and ratified the 1992 Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (FCCC) and also signed the Kyoto Protocol. However, the Bush administration has 
subsequently refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, but has so far not formally withdrawn from the 
agreement. Hence, it is obliged under Art. 18 of  the 1969 Vienna Convention to refrain from acts 
which would defeat the object and purpose of the Kyoto-Protocol because it has signed the treaty 
subject to ratification. Hence, there is the possibility that the GATT obligations are altered. However, 
the obligation under Art.18 of the Vienna Convention ceases once the US has declared not to become 
a party to the treaty.21 Such formal withdrawal would always remain open to the US, therefore it 
would seem wise to apply a precautionary approach to law-making. Possible incompatibilities with 
GATT should be avoided. In the following, we examine potential conflicts of border tax adjustments 
with GATT. 
 
For legal purposes, the border tax adjustments described in the previous section amount to two 
different measures which follow a distinct regime: The first measure, refunds for exports, has to stand 
the test whether it constitutes an outlawed subsidy. The second measure, taxes charged on imports, has 
to fend off the suspicion that it represents an illegal discrimination. At first glance, one might think 
                                                 
17
 Cf. Art. 22 DSU. 
18
 Both the EC and its member states are parties to the Kyoto Protocol. 
19
 On this see e.g. Gabrielle Marceau, Conflicts of Norms and Conflicts of Jurisdictions – The Relationship 
between the WTO Agreement ans MEAs and other Treaties, JWT 35 (6), 1081, 1131, 2001; Mike Meier, GATT, 
WTO, and the Environment: To what extent do GATT/WTO rules permit member states to protect the 
environment when doing so adversely affects trade? (1997) 8 Colorado Journal of International Environmental 
Law & Policy 241 at 271; Doaa Abdel Motaal, Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and WTO Rules 
– Why the “Burden of Accomodation” Should Shift to MEAs, JWT 35 (6): 1215-1233, 2001; Ann Rutgeerts, 
Trade and Environment – Reconciling the Montreal Protocol and the GATT, JWT 33 (4): 61-86, 1999. 
20
 Cf. Ann Rutgeerts (Fn. 19), JWT 33 (4): 61-86, 1999 at 67. 
21
 USCIB, WTO Rules and Procedures and Their Implication for the Kyoto Protocol – A Background Paper, 
11/2002 available at www.uscib.org.  
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that the same criteria should be applied to both measures. However, legally this need not necessarily 
be the case.22 Hence, in the following, the two measures will be analysed separately. This however 
should not be understood so as to preempt the answer on the question whether different standards will 
actually result. 
 
3.1 Exports 
 
Under WTO law, countries must not subsidize most form of exports (agriculture being the lamentable 
exception). Art. XVI:4 GATT states that contracting parties must not grant directly or indirectly any 
form of subsidy on the export of any product other than a primary product which results in the sale of 
such a product for export for a lower price than the comparable price charged for the like products to 
domestic buyers. If prohibited subsidies are granted, the importing state may under conditions spelt 
out in Art. VI:3 and 6 (a) GATT impose countervailing duties23 on the imported good. However, Art. 
VI:4 GATT makes it clear that a countervailing duty must not be implemented where a product 
destined for export is exempted from duties or taxes borne by the like product when destined for 
consumption in the region of origin or exportation, or such duties or taxes are refunded on exportation. 
In the same vein, under the note ad Art. XVI, these exemptions or remissions do not constitute 
subsidies under that article.  
 
The 1994 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures extends the range of adjustable prior-
stage cumulative taxes under GATT.24 Annex I to the agreement contains an illustrative list of 
prohibited export subsidies. Litera (h) allows a region to remit taxes in respect of prior stages 
cumulative taxes on inputs that are consumed in the production of the exported product, making 
normal allowances for waste. Footnote 61 to Annex II specifies that inputs consumed are not only 
inputs physically incorporated, but also energy, fuels and oils used in the production process and 
catalysts which are consumed in the course of their use to obtain the exported product.25  
                                                 
22
 On the similar question whether the rules guiding border tax adjustments on inports and exports should be 
symmetrical see e.g Ole Kristian Fauchald, Environmental Taxes and Trade Discrimination, 1998 at 166 with 
further references. 
23
 A different issue is whether lax environmental standards can give rise to countermeasures. This should be 
denied, cf. Düerkop (fn. 15), at 830 f. 
24
 Cf. the general interpretative note to Annex Ia of the 1994 WTO Agreement. 
25
 The Assistant US Trade Representative claims that a gentleman´s agreement applies to the extension in the 
footnote (Donald M. Phillips, Letter to Abraham Katz, President of the United States Council for International 
Business, Reprinted in U.S. Secures Agreement not to Use GATT to Allow Energy Tax Rebate, Inside 
U.S.Trade, 28 January 1994. Accordingly it would only apply to the few countries that still have a cumulative 
indirect taxes rather than a VAT. The footnote could then not be invoked by developed countries with respect to 
energy taxes (Demaret/Stewardson (fn. 10)p. 30). However, no written proof for the agreement exists. 
(Demaret/Stewardson, ibid.). Furthermore, the agreement if it existed would not change the obligations of the 
parties in the sense implied as the form would be inappropriate (see Biermann/Brohm, Implementing the Kyoto 
Protocol without the United States: The Strategic Role of Energy Tax Adjustments at the Border, Working Paper 
of the Global Governance Project, no. 5, 2003 (downloadable at  
     11 
 
Consequently, it appears that tax exemptions and remissions for energy and fuel on exported products 
would be admissible under WTO rules.26 From this does not automatically follow, admittedly, that any 
costs for certificates should be deductible as well. One might argue that the omission of emission 
certificates in the text of Annex I does create obstacles insofar as it allows an e contrario argument. 
However, that would not seem too convincing as the list is labeled merely illustrative. The GATT, on 
the other hand, mentions duties alongside taxes e.g. in Art VI:4. Generally, taxes can be defined as A 
tax is a compulsory contribution imposed by government for which taxpayers receive nothing 
identifiable in return for their contribution.27 Defining duties in the same vein would require there at 
least to be a compulsory payment made to the state. In order to prevent abuse, it cannot include 
payments to the government made in return for a more or less specific service. Also, a fee for using a 
motorway or, more controversially, a fee for a broadcasting licence would probably not be included. In 
all these cases, the service given to the individual already compensates her for the costs incurred. The 
same, however, is not true for the right to emit CO2: In the case of motorways, the individual gets a 
service that did not exist before the government provided the infrastructure. It could equally be 
provided by private firms. Similarly, the necessity for a broadcasting licence simultaneously serves the 
interests of the applicant as she will be protected from others trying to broadcast on the same 
frequency, thus making hers inaudible. The necessity of a permit for emitting CO2 almost exclusively 
serves the interests of the wider community. Hence, the costs of obtaining the permits should not be 
seen as providing such a service. Taking the component of payment to the state, the costs incurred by 
buying from the state and only these can be remitted.  
 
Yet for all purposes in a decentralized economy it appears difficult to identify the inputs of a product 
for which certificates have been bought from the state. This presents two problems: First, what level 
should be used for the border-tax adjustment? Secondly, how to measure the product, e.g. based on 
volume, weight or value, to best relate it to the input components? On the first question, the only 
feasible way would be to use the average cost of the certificates that were either bought or allocated 
from the state. For example, if half of the certificates in circulation are allocated to each business free 
of charge and the second half had to be bought for a price of 100, the price used for adjustment 
purposes would be 50.28 The average cost would then have to be multiplied by the combined quantity 
of emissions from all production stages. In the context of grandfathering, this severely curtails the 
                                                                                                                                                        
www.glogov.org/workingpapers/workingpaper5.html), p. 24 who analyse the implications under Art. 31 and 32 
of the 1969 Vienna Convention). 
26
 Further concerns are raised by Fauchald (Fn. 22), 188 ff. who asks whether energy taxes really are prior-stage 
cumulative taxes rather than prior-stage specific stages. However, this distinction does not seem to be upheld any 
more. 
27
 Similar definitions apply in the context of the OECD Model Tax Convention, cf. only Ismer/Sailer, 
Internationales Steuerrecht 2003, 622, 623. 
28
 Under rational expectations, the market price for the certificates can be assumed to be equal to the price paid 
to the state in the framework of an auction. 
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effectiveness of BTA. From this perspective, it might appear more appropriate to simply take the 
market price of the certificates. The issuing of the certificates would then be considered a lump sum 
transfer to the firms. However, even provided these lump sum transfers would not run foul of WTO 
subsidy rules, the legal terminology, which speaks of duties and likens them to taxes might prevent 
this interpretation. On the second question, again a general solution seems to be warranted, for the 
quantity of emissions can hardly be ascertained and even where it could, it would imply that for all 
exports the incentive to produce with the least amount of greenhouse gas emissions would be 
eliminated. Therefore, exported products should receive the same remission irrespective of how they 
were actually produced. Regarding the level of tax remitted, it should be borne in mind that there is the 
danger of the remission turning into an illegal subsidy distorting the playing field. Hence, the amount 
should be fixed at a rather conservative (i.e. low) level.29 This issue will be further discussed, in 
section 3.3, once the import side has been discussed. 
3.2 Imports 
 
Since border tax adjustments on imports cannot act as quantitative restrictions outlawed under Art. XI 
GATT, two major requirements must be met under GATT. First, WTO member states are obliged to 
offer every other member state most favoured nation status with respect to any border restrictions, Art. 
I GATT. Secondly, Art. III GATT stipulates that foreign producers be treated no less advantageous 
than domestic producers (national treatment clause). This applies to like products (Art. III:2 first 
sentence GATT) and to directly competitive and substitutable products (Art. III:2 second sentence). 
3.2.1 Art. III:2 first sentence GATT: Like products 
 
As the Appellate Body sees the first sentence of Art. III:2 GATT as a special case of the second, it 
construes the former narrowly.30 According to Art. III:2 first sentence GATT, member states shall not 
subject imported products, directly or indirectly to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind 
in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly to like domestic products.  
 
This implies two criteria: Firstly, the question would have to be answered whether domestic and 
foreign products are like.31 GATT does not contain a definition of that term. Consequently, it is 
sometimes suggested that any attempt of defining likeness would be inappropriate.32 Rather, any 
                                                 
29
 The Report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, adopted on 2 December 1970, L/3464, para. 16 
found it sensible to rebate some taxes for composite products by average rates for a given class of goods, where 
the taxes were generally eligible for adjustment, but where the calculation of the exact amount presented 
difficulties.  This point should not be confused with the rationale for using average rates to calculate the charges 
borne per permit. 
31
 It should be noted that the term “like” in Art. III:2 first sentence GATT has a narrower meaning than the same 
term under Art. III:4 GATT, cf. only European Community – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, para. 99. 
32
 See for example Mattoo/Subramanian, Regulatory Autonomy and Multilateral Disciplines: The Dilemma ans 
a Possible Solution, JIEL 1998 1 (303).  
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distinction made on regulatory grounds should be allowed. To determine whether an infraction of Art. 
III GATT has occurred, it has to be examined if protectionist intent inspired the distinction or a 
protectionist effect followed from it. This “aims and effects” test33 can imply that products with 
different production processes are no longer like products.34 The WTO judiciary, however, has 
explicitly rejected this test35 and adopted a different stance. Likeness is assessed taking into account 
physical properties, the product’s properties, nature and quality, its end-uses in a given market, 
consumers´ tastes and habits, as well as the tariff classification of the product36. Production processes 
that do not change the physical properties etc. of the product are considered to be irrelevant.37 For both 
approaches, like products could probably be found in the case of border tax adjustments: Assuming 
that both foreign and domestic products would be manufactured with a plenitude of technologies, the 
first-mentioned approach would have to consider products produced with a similar technology to be 
like, while the judiciary would have to consider the entire group of homogeneous products to be like. 
Hence, one can say that the criterion of like products would under both approaches pose a 
surmountable hurdle. 
 
Secondly, the taxes or charges applied to the foreign product must not be in excess of those applied to 
like domestic products. This in turn mainly raises two points38: What taxes or charges are taken into 
account when determining the taxes and charges on the respective products? And what is the yardstick 
to determine whether there is an excess – are foreign products considered individually or are they 
considered as a group? 
 
While it is clear that the imported product would be subject to the (border adjustment) tax, it is less so 
which taxes and charges are applied to the domestic product.39 As it has been held in the Superfund 
                                                 
33
 United States – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, Report of the Panel, DS23/R- 39S/206, 
adopted on 19 June 1992, at 5.25; United States – Taxes on Automobiles, Report of the Panel, DS31/R, 
unadopted, at 5.10. The approach is however no longer adhered to in the WTO judiciary, cf. fn. 36. 
34
 Biermann/Brohm (Fn. 25), 2003, p. 27; Howse/Regan, The Product/Process Distinction – An Illusory Basis for 
Disciplining “Unilateralism” in Trade Policy,  European Journal of International Law 2000.11, 249-289. Against 
the “aims and effects” test John H. Jackson, Comments on Shrimps/Turtle and the Product/Process Distinction, 
11 EJIL 303 - 308, 2000, at 304; Quick/Lau, Environmentally Motivated Tax Distinctions and WTO Law – The 
European Commission’s Green Paper on Integrated Product Policy in Light of `Like Product´ and ´PPM`-
Debates, JIEL 6(2), 419-458, 2003, at 452 ff. 
35
 Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, adopted 1 November 1996, 
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, AB, p. 20.; more explicitly confirmed in European 
Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Report of the Appellate Body, 
WT/DS 27/AB/R, p. 100, para. 241. 
36
 Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, adopted 1 November 1996, 
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, AB, p. 20. 
37
 In the following it will be assumed that consumers’ tastes and habits do not overcome the “strong presumption 
of likeness [for physically identical products]” (Quick/Lau, (Fn. 34) at 431). 
38
 This structure of Art. III:2 first sentence GATT can be explicitly found e.g. in Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages, Report of the Appelate Body, adopted on 1 November 1996, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, 
WT/DS11/AB/R , p. 18. 
39
 For a discussion of the (economic) rationale behind the distiction see Demaret/Stewardson (Fn. 25) at pp. 14 
ff. 
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Case40, the reason for imposing the tax, i.e. whether the tax was levied to encourage the rational use of 
environmental resources or for general revenue purposes, is irrelevant. Furthermore, indirect taxes like 
a sales tax or a VAT are definitely taxes applied on the domestic product. Border tax adjustments for 
these taxes are commonplace in practice (an example would be excise taxes on the import of goods41), 
and can legally be so as they are levied on foreign and domestic products alike.42 In contrast, there is a 
widespread view that direct taxes, among them in particular taxes on profits, are not levied on the 
product and hence do not count for the tax burden on the domestic product.43 Thus, adjustments for 
direct taxes44 would be in breach of the GATT obligations. Therefore, the question arises, on which 
side of the direct/indirect taxes dividing line the costs for emissions certificates would fall.  
 
In pursuit of an answer to the question, what, if any, costs for emissions certificates are applied to the 
product, it might be worthwhile to first seek clarification as to how a tax on carbon emissions would 
be classified and then to ask whether that classification extends to the case of emissions certificates. 
On the first question, scholars are divided.45 On the one hand, some argue46 that Art. II: 2 (a) GATT47 
indicates that energy taxes should not be viewed as a tax adjustable at the border. Yet since this clause 
allows certain behaviour by the parties, it should be construed as widening their policy space, if it is 
not seen as being merely declaratory. Nothing in the wording indicates that the clause actually seeks to 
disallow certain behaviour. The weight of this argument therefore does not seem to be too great. On 
the other, as it has been shown above, a moderate adjustment for exports seems possible. Although the 
rules for exports and imports have evolved separately and no references in dispute settlement report on 
Art. III GATT make remarks on exports, quite strong arguments support a symmetrical treatment48: 
The wording in Art. I GATT uses the term “originating in or destined for” in a way that tends to 
support a symmetric treatment49. Furthermore, a symmetric treatment has the advantage of simplicity. 
Moreover a symmetric treatment ensures that the destination principle is applied as coherently and 
efficiently as possible in order to avoid excessive trade distortion. Although Member states do not 
                                                 
40
 United States – Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances (“Superfund”), Report of the Panel 
adopted on 17 June 1987, BISD 34S/136, para 5.2.3 – 5.2.4. 
41
 E.g. for the European Union Art. 2 no. 2 of the 6th Council Directive 77/388 of the 17th May 1977 on the 
harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes (6th VAT Directive). 
42
 Note Ad Art. III explicitly states that any internal tax or other internal charge which applies to an imported 
product and to the like domestic product and is collected in the case of the imported product at the time or point 
of importation, is nevertheless to be regarded as an internal tax or other internal charge.   
43
 Demaret/Stewardson (Fn. 25), p. 16.  
44
 Report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments (Fn. 29), para. 8. 
45
 Cf. e.g. Pitschas (fn. 15), at 493; Düerkop (fn. 15), at 822 ff. (before the 1994 Understanding on Subsidies); 
Sebastian Puth, WTO und Umwelt – Die Produkt-Prozess-Doktrin, 2003, 268; Biermann/Brohm. 
46
 Pitschas (fn. 15), at 493. 
47
 Reading: „Nothing in this article shall prevent the parties from imposing on the importation of any product a 
charge equivalent to an internal tax imposed consistently with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III … in 
respect of an article from which the imported product has been manufactured in whole or in part.” The equally 
valid French text, can be considered to give even more support to that view, when it speakes slightly differently 
of “une marchandise qui a été incorporée dans l’article importé.” 
48
 Demaret/Stewardson (Fn. 25), pp. 30 f.; Fauchald (Fn. 22), pp. 166 ff.; against such a symmetry in this case 
Puth (fn. 45), 268 because he considers the rule for exports as the result of a specific political compromise. 
49
 Fauchald, (Fn. 22), p. 166. 
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have an obligation to make symmetric use of adjustments they are allowed to make, they should be 
given the possibility to avoid double taxation or double non-taxation, 50 each of which would disturb 
the level playing field among competitors that is vital for the welfare gains from international trade to 
be reaped. For an answer to the second question, the results obtained for export border tax 
adjustments, equally apply to imports. Hence, the average costs of emissions certificates procured 
from the state can be treated like a tax. 
  
When it comes to the yardstick, the question is only whether “like” imported products are subject to 
higher taxes, not whether the difference leads to a significant distortion in trade flows.51 In particular, 
it does not matter whether only 1.5 per cent of domestic output profited from a lower tax rate.52  
 
Thus, if one followed the view that likeness must not be denied by taking into account production 
methods, then all products must regardless of how they were made be considered as homogeneous. 
The only way to introduce border tax adjustments would then be to take the lowest charges incurred 
by any domestic producer. To make this practically feasible, the lowest amount should be estimated by 
assessing the quantity of greenhouse gases that would have been emitted when all components had 
been manufactured with best available technology.53 This is certainly only a second best solution. The 
adjustment would not completely equalise the playing field as foreign producers would regardless of 
their production technology be assumed to have produced with best available technology, e.g. an 
energy inefficient US steel producer would only pay the import taxes corresponding to CO2 costs 
incurred by the most efficient European producer. Yet it would constitute an improvement to the 
situation without any adjustment. Moreover, it would provide a viable alternative which would be 
legal under GATT – discrimination against domestic producers is not illegal and it does not hurt a 
foreign producer if it assumed that her production technology was more ecologically sound than it 
really was. It would also send a political signal of goodwill to other WTO parties that the measure was 
not about discrimination. It might be advisable to entrust the definition of the best available 
technology standard to an independent body. This would help to reduce the impact of the collision of 
interest arising from the fact that foreign industry would want the standard to be the lowest possible, 
whereas domestic producers would want to see it high.54  
                                                 
50
 Demaret /Stewardsson (Fn. 25), p. 31. 
51
 See Simonetta Zarrilli, Domestic Taxation of Energy Products and Multilateral Trade Rules: Is This a Case of 
Unlawful Discrimination? JWT 37 (2), 359-394, 2003 at 371 f. with references to the WTO/GATT judiciary. 
52
 United States – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages (Fn. 33), para. 5.6. 
53
 This concept can e.g. be defined as the most effective and advanced stage in the development of activities and 
their methods of operations which indicate the practical suitability for providing in principle the basis for 
emission limit values designed to prevent and, where that is not practicable, generally to reduce emissions and 
the impact on the environment as a whole, cf. European Commission Council Directive 96/61/EC of 24 
September 1996 Concerning Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control. 
54
 The position of domestic industry can be explained by two factors: one is the fact that a higher border tax 
adjustment would make the foreign products less competitive. The second is the fact that where the border tax 
adjsutments are applied symmetrically, domestic industry would receive a higher payback. This gives cause for 
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If, in contrast, one held the view that production processes are relevant for “likeness”, then there 
would be as many different products as there were substitutable production processes. The treatment 
of every imported product would have to be compared to that of the respective domestic product. It 
would have to be taken into account that less favourable treatment to some products cannot be 
balanced by more favourable treatment to others. Accordingly, in the Reformulated Gasoline Case,55 
the panel did not accept as a valid defense the fact that on average the treatment of foreign and 
domestic firms was equivalent. This is not contradicted by the Superfund Case56 where the GATT 
panel considered the method by the US, which imposed an adjusting tax amounting to what would 
have been payable under the predominant US production method, to be in accordance with GATT 
rules. For foreign producers had the possibility of establishing that less of the input in question was 
used and that the tax charged should thus be lower.57 This principle implies for border tax adjustments 
that Art. III:2 first sentence GATT is violated where the foreign producer does not have the possibility 
to show that her carbon emissions were lower than the standard assumed for adjustment, while 
domestic producers pay according to their true emissions. Then, two approaches were feasible: on the 
one hand, one could adopt an approach where each business has upon importation to demonstrate how 
much greenhouse gas was emitted during production. This seems even less desirable for imports than 
for exports. While the latter are subject to the control of the exporting state, the production of the 
former has taken place outside its jurisdiction. Because of the territoriality principle under public 
international law, any controls would, unless the other state consented, have to be carried out by 
officials of that other state. These controls, however risk to be somewhat ineffective, as it might not be 
in the best interest of that other state to apply them too stringently: That state might pursue a different 
environmental agenda. Furthermore, a lower adjustment would imply a higher profit margin for the 
exporting company from the transaction, which can under certain conditions feed through to higher tax 
revenue of the exporting state.58 Moreover, more production in that region generally implies more 
domestic employment. All these arguments would favour the second approach which would again be 
the best available technology approach rather than a production process specific adjustment tax.. 
 
Hence, the best technology approach would be allowed under Art. III:2 first sentence GATT. Indeed if 
one shared the view of the judiciary that production processes were irrelevant for likeness under that 
provision, it would constitute the only admissible way. If one did not, it would still be the only way 
                                                                                                                                                        
concern as domestic lobbbying could make state officials inclined to higher standards. Therefore, procedural 
safeguards seem warranted. 
55
 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Panel, WT/DS2/R, from 
29 January 1996, adopted with alterations concerning other points on 20 May 1996, pp. 37 f. at 6.14.  
56
 Report of the GATT Panel, United States: Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, 17 June 
1987, BISD 34S/136. Not convincing on this point Biermann/Brohm (Fn. 25), 26. More generous for exports, 
Report of the  Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments (Fn. 29), para 16. 
57
 This is pointed out by Demaret/Stewardson (Fn. 25), p. 26. 
58
 See Art. 7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. 
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really feasible. Further discussion of compatibility with Art. III:2 second sentence GATT and Art. I 
GATT will therefore concentrate on this approach. 
3.2.2 Art. III:2 GATT: Directly competitive and substitutable products 
 
Art. III: 2, second sentence GATT in conjunction with Art. III:1 GATT and the Note Ad Article III 
demands that imports must not be taxed dissimilarly from directly competitive or substitutable 
domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production. With respect to taxation, this 
raises three questions59: Do the foreign and domestic products compete? If so, are the imported and 
domestic products not similarly taxed, which requires a difference that must be more than de 
minimis60? And finally: Is the dissimilar taxation applied so as to afford protection to domestic 
production? This last question demands – diverging from Art. III: 2 first sentence GATT – that 
protective impact has to be separately ascertained.  
 
Again, problems with this provision can be avoided when a best available technology border tax 
adjustment is applied priced at the average price per permit paid to the state. On the second question, it 
would however not be sufficient to argue that domestic products in the same fiscal class would be 
taxed or charged at a higher rate. Rather, a comprehensive approach has to look at all the directly 
competitive or substitutable domestic and imported goods. 61 One might conceive a situation where 
mainly foreign highly energy intensive goods directly compete with (“unlike” in the sense of Art. III:2 
first sentence GATT) products made mainly domestically and with little energy input. Consider the 
following hypothetical example: Aluminium cars compete directly with steel cars. The former 
consume far more energy in production than the latter. Most imported cars are aluminium cars. Of the 
steel cars only a tiny number is imported. Then imported cars are generally taxed at a higher rate. The 
third question of whether the measure affords protection would thus become pertinent for border tax 
adjustments, where the tax difference is less than de minimis. In view of the fact that Members of the 
WTO have sovereign authority to determine the basis on which they will tax goods and to classify 
goods accordingly, provided they respect their WTO commitments62, this could be safely denied: A 
dispute resolution board, which would in the framework of a comprehensive and objective63 analysis 
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 Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, adopted 1 November 1996, 
WT/DS8/AB/R,WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, p. 24; confirmed in Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 
Report of the Appellate Body, adopted 12 January 2000, WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DS/110/AB/R, para. 47. 
60
 Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, adopted 1 November 1996, 
WT/DS8/AB/R,WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, p. 27; confirmed in Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 
Report of the Appellate Body, adopted 12 January 2000, WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DS/110/AB/R, para. 49. 
61
 Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, adopted 12 January 2000, 
WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DS/110/AB/R, para. 53. 
62
 Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, adopted 12 January 2000, 
WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DS/110/AB/R, para. 60. 
63
 Since the subjective intentions of the individual legislators or regulators are not to be considered because they 
are accessible to treaty interpreters, Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, 
adopted 12 January 2000, WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DS/110/AB/R, para. 62. In a similar vein see Japan – Taxes on 
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have to look at the design, the architecture and the revealing structure of the measure, would find a 
linear tax-scheme.64 This linearity would moreover be in harmony with the objective65 of CO2 
abatement and with the (community-wide) emissions trading scheme. And finally even though it 
appears possible that some mainly imported goods fell into a class viewed as high energy intensive 
even at best available technology, it would seem a rather contrived example and not the norm like in 
the Alcohol Cases66, where almost all imported products fell in the higher tax groups, this cannot be 
expected for the border tax adjustment scheme.  
3.2.3 Art. I GATT: Most Favoured Nation Principle 
 
The system of border tax adjustment with best available technology would not violate the most 
favoured nation principle of Art. I GATT, as the system would apply to any imports regardless of 
whether the product is imported from a Kyoto member country or not. Also, just as under VAT, 
imports followed by exports of the products would in the end result in no net taxes to be borne by the 
products as the remission of taxes would follow the same standard.67 
3.3 Interim Conclusion 
 
It has been demonstrated that a system of border tax adjustments for imports with best available 
technology standards priced at average costs would not fall foul of GATT. It has further been shown 
that subsidies ought to follow a general standard of best available technology. It would therefore seem 
logical to extend the proposal from imports to exports as well. Again, this would never be a subsidy, 
as it would only remit the minimum of internal charges incurred by domestic producers. This would 
result in the symmetrical system, which has been advocated before to be made complete. 
3.4 Auxiliary Point:  Justification under Art. XX GATT 
 
If a scheme other than the best available technology approach were implemented that was not in 
compliance with Art. III or I GATT or if one did not share the conviction expressed in this paper that 
                                                                                                                                                        
Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, adopted 1 November 1996, 
WT/DS8/AB/R,WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R. pp. 27 ff. 
64
 This is a significant contrast to the Chilean Alcohol Case where due to their alcohol contents most imported 
products fell into a progressive zone. The point was stressed by the Appelate Body, cf. Chile – Taxes on 
Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, adopted 12 January 2000, WT/DS87/AB/R, 
WT/DS/110/AB/R, para. 63. 
65
 Objectives have to be taken into account as was confirmed by the Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 
Report of the Appellate Body, adopted 12 January 2000, WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DS/110/AB/R, para. 71, though 
this is not a test of whether the measures are necessary (ibid., para. 72). 
66
 Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, adopted 1 November 1996, 
WT/DS8/AB/R,WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R; Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the 
Appellate Body, adopted 17 February 1999, WT/DS75/AB/R,WT/DS84/AB/R; Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, adopted 12 January 2000, WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DS/110/AB/R. 
67
 There might however be intertemporal effects where a product is exported after an improvement in best 
available technology has resulted in a lowering of the border tax adjustment. Then the product would, if no 
exceptional clause were to be provided, in effect bear taxes. 
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the said scheme would be consistent with Art. III: 2 GATT, Art. XX GATT might provide a 
justification.68 The judiciary on world trade has evolved so as to construe a two-tier structure of 
justification under the article. First, it has to be examined whether the requirements of any of the eight 
headings are fulfilled. Of these, Art. XX (b) and (g) GATT appear pertinent. Second, the chapeau, 
which aims at preventing abuse of the exceptions of Art. XX,69 basically demands that the measures 
must not be applied in a discriminatory way. Before going into the details of Art. XX GATT, it should 
be stressed that although the Kyoto Protocol aims at the protection of a global common, there is not 
really a question of extraterritoriality to be answered: Though border tax adjustments partly aim at 
changing behaviour in other states, the consequences of global warming should establish a sufficient 
nexus to the territory.70  
3.4.1 Art. XX (b) GATT 
 
Art. XX (b) GATT allows measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.71 This 
again implies a two-tier structure. First, the policy of reducing CO2 emissions must be designed to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health. This can be easily ascertained for the import border tax 
adjustment, as the clause should not only allow measures to reduce immediately harmful emissions but 
also those of greenhouse gases which cause a global problem in the longer run72 and since WTO 
Members have the right to determine the level of protection they consider appropriate in a given 
situation.73 Problems arise however with respect to exports. Border tax adjustments for these serve 
mainly the purpose of removing competitive disadvantages for domestic industry. As has been shown 
in the previous section, prices might be lower implying more consumption. As a countervailing effect, 
existing demand can be satisfied by domestic producers that are more efficient than foreign ones. 
Hence, the overall effect on greenhouse gas emissions is ambiguous. Therefore the rather difficult 
question arises what exactly constitutes the measure in question: Do the import and export measures 
have to be considered in isolation. Does the set of border tax adjustments form the measure? Or should 
one go even further and bundle all provisions on emissions trading into one measure? Seeing the 
passage of the directive without the adjustments and remembering the panel-report on the Superfund 
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 On this provision, cf. eg. Weiß/Herrmann, Welthandelsrecht, 2003, 208 ff.  
69
 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, adopted on 20 May 1996, 
WT/DS2/AB/R, DSR 1996:I, p. 21; United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
Report of the Appelate Body, adopted on 6 November 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R, DSR 1998:VII, p. 2803. 
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 For details on this point see Bernhard Kluttig, Welthandelsrecht und Umweltschutz – Kohärenz statt 
Konkurrenz, Arbeitspapiere aus dem Institut für Wirtschaftsrecht der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-
Wittenberg, Heft 12, 2003, p. 25 ff.; Jochem Wieters, Trade and Environment in the EC and the WTO – A Legal 
Analysis, 2002, p. 273 ff. with further references. 
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 On this exception, see e.g. United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of 
the Panel, WT/D52/R, from 29 January 1996, adopted with alterations concerning other points on 20 May 1996 
at para 6.20. 
72
 Cf. Zarrilli (Fn. 51),  JWT 2003, 359-394 at 384. 
73
 European Community – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, Report of the 
Appellate Body, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, para 168. 
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Case74 and in particular the explanations of the Appellate Body in the US Gasoline report75, one would 
be inclined to reject the third proposal. But also the second proposal is subject to doubts: In theory, the 
two directions of border tax adjustments appear separable. The arguments advanced in favor of a 
symmetric treatment of exports and imports come into play here as well. Their weight should be 
sufficient so that the measure in question should indeed be the border tax adjustments in both 
directions. 
 
Second, the measure must be “necessary” in the sense that it has to be the least trade-restrictive. An 
alternative measure, which is consistent or less inconsistent with GATT must be used where that can 
be reasonably expected.76 This demands a process of weighing and balancing a series of factors, 
including the importance of the common interests protected by the measure, the contribution of the 
trade-restriction for the success of the protection of the interests and the impact on trade flows.77 The 
more vital or important the common interests or values pursued, the easier it is to establish that the 
measures in question are necessary to achieve those ends.78 Concerning the standards necessary to 
show that common interests are at risk and that the measure can help to disperse that risk, a member is 
not obliged to automatically follow what at a given time constitutes a majority scientific opinion. 
Hence, it can rely in good faith on a respected minority opinion.79 Accordingly, given the threat posed 
by global warming and considering the negligible negative impact on trade flows – the measures even 
if it comes in a different guise than the best available technology adjustment would still aim  to level 
the playing field – border tax adjustments for imports should meet the second test as well. Because of 
the symmetry argument, this extends to border tax adjustments in general. Hence, Art. XX (b) GATT 
is fulfilled.  
 
3.4.2 Art. XX (g) GATT 
 
Art. XX (g) GATT demands that the measure be related to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production 
or consumption. In the Reformulated Gasoline Case80, the panel construed the heading as requiring 
three criteria: First, the policy in respect of the measure for which the provision is invoked must be 
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 United States – Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances (“Superfund”), Report of the Panel 
adopted on 17 June 1987, BISD 34S/136. 
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 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Appellate Body, 
adopted on 20 May 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R, pp. 13 f. (on Art. XX (g) GATT). 
76
 Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, Report of the Appellate Body, 
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 Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, Report of the Appellate Body, 
WT/DS161/AB/R, 11 December 2000, para 164. 
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 Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, Report of the Appellate Body, 
WT/DS161/AB/R, 11 December 2000, para 162. 
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 European Community – Asbestos, para 178. 
80
 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Panel (Fn. 71), para. 
6.35. 
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related to the conservation of a natural resource. This can easily be ascertained as the aim of a 
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions at the same time contributes to the preservation of natural fossil 
fuel resources. Furthermore, one could probably argue that a preservation of the atmospheric CO2 
concentration constitute a natural resource as well, considering the wide interpretation given to this 
term in the Shrimp Turtle Case.81  
 
Second, the measure itself must be related to the conservation of natural resources. For a while, the 
GATT and WTO panels held that  “related to” should be interpreted as “primarily aimed at”.However, 
this rather narrow interpretation seems to have been replaced in the Shrimp/Turtles Case by a wider 
one, which only demanded that the measure be “directly connected” to the conservation policy.82 As 
demonstrated above, border tax adjustments for imports would serve the environmental purpose of 
helping to ensure that the most efficient producers worldwide carry the day. Again taking symmetry as 
given, the direct connection would be fulfilled for border tax adjustments for imports and exports.  
 
Third, the requirement that such measures must be made effective in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption. The clause demands even-handedness in the imposition of 
restrictions in the name of conservation.83 The requirement that measures concerned must impose 
restrictions not only on imported, but also on domestic products is clearly satisfied when one takes 
into account the fact that domestic products have been hit by a domestic84 tax at least as high as 
imported ones. 
 
3.4.3 Chapeau of Art. XX GATT 
 
As the second step, the chapeau85 requires that the measure in its application must neither constitute an 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, nor a 
disguised restriction on international trade.86 All three criteria have to be met: there must neither be an 
                                                 
81
 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body 
WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, pp. 46 ff., para. 127 ff. Cf. also United States – Standards for 
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Panel (Fn. 71), para. 6.37, where it was held that clean 
air was a natural resource. 
82
 Cf. Geert van Calster, The WTO Appellate Body in Shrimp/Turtle: Picking up the Pieces, European 
Environmental Law Review 8 (4): 111-119, 1999, at 114 f. 
83
 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Appellate Body, 
adopted on 20 May 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R, DSR 1996:I, p. 19. 
84
 Whether or not the imported product has been hit by a tax in the state where the production took place, should 
not matter, as that state had the possibility of remitting the taxes up to the standard of best available technology 
as well. This result is supported by the fact that otherwise verification problems arise. 
85
 Cf. e.g. Quick/Lau (Fn. 34) at 440 ff.  
86
 The same obligation follows from Art. 3 para 5 second sentence FCCC: “Measures taken to combat climate 
change, including unilateral ones should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a 
disguised restriction on international trade.” 
     22 
arbitrary nor an unjustifiable discrimination87 nor a disguised restriction on international trade.88 They 
have to be read side by side, imparting meaning on each other.89 The fundamental theme lies in the 
purpose of avoiding abuse or illegitimate use of the exceptions in Art. XX GATT.90 This implies that 
the considerations pertinent in deciding whether the application of a particular measure amounts to 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination can be taken into account when determining the presence of a 
disguised restriction.91 The standard has generally to be lower than the one under Art. III GATT, as 
otherwise there could never be a justification for violations of that provision.92 When interpreting the 
provisions, the context of the norm and in particular the preamble to the WTO agreement as well as 
the preamble to the Decision on Trade and Environment, all of which confirm the WTO´s undertaking 
to pursue the aim of sustainable development, need to be respected.93 A balance has to be struck 
between the right of a Member to invoke an exception under Art. XX GATT and the duty of that same 
Member to respect the treaty rights of the other Members.94 Factors taken into account have included 
the following. First, the fact that other countries would be forced to adopt virtually the same approach 
as the state taking the measure. Second, the failure to engage in serious negotiations95 with the other 
Members before taking the measure.96 Third, a differential treatment among various countries.97 The 
second factor can hardly be said to be the case for emissions trading schemes, in particular seeing the 
history of the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol. The first and the third factor would have to be 
observed when implementing a border tax adjustment. In particular, it would appear necessary, if a 
                                                 
87
 It would be a fallacy to argue that since all foreign countries would be treated alike under the proposed system, 
the criterion is irrelevant: Not only can there be the same conditions in all foreign countries, but also between the 
importing and the exporting state, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
Report of the Appellate Body, adopted on 20 May 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R, DSR 1996:I, p. 23 f. 
88
 Previously in United States – Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, adopted on 22 
February 1982, BISD 29S/91-09, the criterion has been interpreted as requiring formal transparency. 
89
 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Appellate Body, 
adopted on 20 May 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R, DSR 1996:I, p. 25. Very critical of this approach Fiona Macmillan, 
WTO and the Environment, 2001, 88 f. More in the direction of a separate application of the requirements 
United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report to the Appelate Body, 
adopted on 6 November 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R, DSR 1998:VII, para 150. 
90
 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Appellate Body, 
adopted on 20 May 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R, DSR 1996:I, p. 25. 
91
 Ibid. 
92
 Cf. United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Appellate Body, 
adopted on 20 May 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R, DSR 1996:I, p. 28 f.: “In our view these two omissions go well 
beyond what was necessary for the Panel to determine that a violation of Art. III:4 GATT had occurred in the 
first place.” 
93
 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report to the Appelate Body, 
adopted on 6 November 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R, DSR 1998:VII, p. 2803 ff. 
94
 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report to the Appelate Body, 
adopted on 6 November 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R, DSR 1998:VII, p. 2805 f. Critical of the discretion on the part 
of the WTO Panel and Appellate Board, Fiona Macmillan, WTO and the Environment, 2001, p.103. 
95
 There is no obligation to actually conclude an international agreement, as has been made clear by the follow-
on case brought by Malaysia: United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products – 
Recourse to Art. 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, Report to the Appelate Body, adopted on 21 November 2001, 
WT/DS58/AB/RW, para. 122: there must only be comparable efforts made to secure an agreement. 
96
 On this cf. already United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, adopted on 20 
May 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R, DSR 1996:I, p. 28. 
97
 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report to the Appelate Body, 
adopted on 6 November 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R, DSR 1998:VII, p. 2810. 
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scheme were to be implemented that was not in accordance with Art. III or I GATT, to take Members’ 
efforts at CO2 abatement and their respective obligations under the Kyoto Protocol, provided they are 
members, into account. Hence, border tax adjustments for trade with ratifying Kyoto signatories would 
meet difficulties when these states chose a regulatory approach.98 This in turn threatens to introduce 
“Trojan horse regions” into the Kyoto system that envisage trade with non-Kyoto regions without any 
border tax adjustments. These regions might then be able to export goods imported from non-Kyoto 
regions without border tax adjustments, if only after they have sufficiently modified them to fulfil the 
rules of origin.99 Anti-abuse provisions against such a behaviour could result in tremendous 
uncertainty. 
  
Hence, it can be said that if the first line of defense, i.e. that Art. III GATT is not violated, were to 
break down, the proposed scheme could still be maintained, as there is the possibility of a justification 
under Art. XX (b) and (g) GATT. However, the scheme would have to be carefully designed in 
particular with respect to other Kyoto regions that pursue a different abatement regime. Therefore, it 
would seem wise to attempt to meet the standards of Art. I and III GATT. 
3.5 Conclusion 
It can therefore be claimed with a reasonable degree of certainty that the introduction of the border tax 
adjustment scheme would indeed be admissible under WTO-rules. It therefore seems worthwhile 
pursuing the path by examining some aspects of the practical implementation.  
                                                 
98
 This argument cannot be used to establish a violation of Art. III:2, first sentence GATT. For in that situation it 
could be argued that a certificates trading scheme created two kinds of costs: costs for buying the certificates and 
abatement costs for avoiding the necessity of their purchas, whereas a regulatory approach created  only the 
latter. Hence a border adjustment tax would put both industries on an equal footing. 
99
 These countries might specialise in modifications that require only limited CO2 emissions. 
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4. Implementation 
In theory, border tax adjustments could be determined for every single product according to the 
quantity of CO2 emissions producing this very product with best available technology. However, the 
huge number of products creates information problems. Therefore, this is not possible in practice: For 
example, it would be very hard to determine what exactly constitutes a homogeneous product and 
what the best available technology was for every single product.  
 
Hence, only an indirect way is possible. We must thus be looking for a measure that is highly 
correlated with the quantity of CO2 emissions during production, which avoids the aforementioned 
problems. Starting point for such an indirect scheme should 
be the fact that a large fraction of CO2 emissions can be 
attributed to the production of basic materials. Therefore we 
have to identify the quantity of different materials utilized in 
the production process. The border tax is calculated by 
multiplying the quantities of different processed materials a 
product consists of with the specific energy composition of 
the respective material. For each process material the non 
electric energy input and the electric energy input are treated 
separately as explained in section 4.5. The resulting number 
will be a lower bound to total energy consumed, because 
additional energy required for the refinement process is not 
included. 
 
To obtain the quantities of processed materials, we suggest to apply a methodology well established in 
the food industry. In many countries, food products have to exhibit the content of the major 
components included in the product.100 Similar to these labels, producers of goods would have to 
specify which quantities of different processed materials are included in their product. However, the 
benefit is, that the labeling is easily verifiable, e.g. by critical competitors questioning the composition 
of the product. At the same time, similar to the food sector, the categories will be wide enough to 
ensure that no critical information is revealed to competitors. 
 
The following sections will explain in some detail how the emissions quantities for each unit of 
processed good can be obtained, whether these quantities should be product or production specific, 
what criteria determine a best available technology, and what size for the processed materials classes 
                                                 
100
 http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/foodlab.html#see2 
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should be adopted. Then the special treatment of the input factor electricity is discussed. Some 
remarks on grandfathering conclude the section. 
 
4.1 Calculation of CO2 emissions associated with the production of 
a processed material 
 
Two basic approaches are established to determine the emissions associated with the 
production of a good. The top down approach uses aggregate information on the energy 
consumption by different sectors, e.g. in Carnegie Mellon (2003) classified by 485 SIC 
groups. The economic input output model is then used to determine how many inputs from 
other sectors are directly or indirectly required to supply one unit of output of the assessed 
sector. This allows capturing the entire supply chain underlying the production of one unit of 
output in one technology sector. Finally the emissions of all sectors are calculated and the 
proportions of the emission that contributes to the output of the sector we are assessing are 
added. This provides for a top down determination of the CO2 (equivalent) emissions of one 
unit of output in any one sector. One database we used for the analysis is SimaPro101 – a Life 
Cycle Assessment (LCA) software package. It enables calculating the environmental impact 
of a product during the entire life-cycle based on a top-down database EPS 2000 used for 
companies’ internal product development.  
 
The second approach is a bottom up approach. The production processes are individually 
examined and registered in a data-base, starting with the basic production steps. Current data 
sets, like Probas or GEMIS,102 cover basic commodities as well as energy specific flow 
patterns.103 Global Emission Model for Integrated Systems (GEMIS) is designed to compute a 
variety of emissions occurring over the complete life-cycle of products. The core database 
covers more than 4,400 processes in over 20 countries. The data is assembled from secondary 
(i.e., literature, averaged data etc.) as well as primary sources (i.e., reports from onsite 
inspectors). These data sets provide a good understanding of the CO2 emission pattern 
corresponding to basic commodities.   
                                                 
101
 SimaPro http://www.pre.nl. 
102
 Probas: Prozessorientierte Basisdaten fuer Umweltmanagement-Instrumente, www.umweltbundesamt.de/uba-
info-daten/daten/baum/, GEMIS http://www.oeko.de/service/gemis/. 
103
 Some of the data basis cover the value including production and transport of fossil fuels. If the corresponding 
energy consumption or CO2 emissions occur outside the territory for which the border tax adjustment is to be 
applied, then they are not covered by CO2 emission certificate obligations. The corresponding emissions should 
therefore not be corrected for as part of the border tax adjustment. 
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Top Down 
Eilco 
Top Down
SimaPro
Bottom Up 
GEMIS 
Bottom Up 
GEMIS 
Bottom Up 
GEMIS 
 CO2/Kg CO2/Kg CO2/Kg CO2/Kg no Electric only electric KWh / Kg 
Steel 0.56 1.19 1.86 1.68 0.26 
Aluminum 3.97 8.45 17.33 9.68 13.40 
Rubber 3.50 1.23 3.28 1.84 2.33 
Figure 1:  Energy intensity of three basic commodities 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the large discrepancy of results derived from a bottom up and a top down 
analysis. Some of the differences can be attributed to poor data quality of top down analysis. 
To access Eilco the measurements, which are based on money, had to be translated into 
quantities using prices.104 The biggest difficulty we were facing in several product groups was 
to obtain accurate commodity wholesale prices. Some of the discrepancies can be explained 
by errors on this level. The data set used in SimaPro is already translated into CO2 emissions 
per Kg product output, therefore the discrepancies to the bottom up approach represented by 
GEMIS are smaller. However, we assume that a main reason for the understatement of 
emissions in the top down analysis relative to the bottom up analysis remains. The sector does 
not only provide the basic commodity but also products which require additional, labor 
intensive input. This pushes up prices without influencing the energy input required in the 
sector significantly. This seems to be the case both with steel and aluminum but not with 
rubber. The result indicates, that a top down analysis requires a more detailed representation 
of the sectors than provided by 485 SIC groups. This does not allow conclusions on the 
bottom up analysis, because the additional refinement, which has little impact on the energy 
intensity per weight of the product such that the products still can be treated with the same tax 
level.  
 
                                                 
104
 Aluminum price 1.4$/kg from London Metal Exchange, Iron and Steel foundries 0.45 $/kg from 
www.citaec.info/steeltaskforce, www.cruspifutires.com, Press release of Oregon Steel Mills, 30.4. 2003, Rubber 
TSR20 0.80$/t, averaged, www.rubberstudy.com/statistics.aspx. The prices were on 2002/2003 price levels, 
while the IO tables were based on the 1992 statistics. Department of Commerce indices suggest that for iron 
products the appropriate deflator changes prices by 10%, not sufficient to bridge the gap 
www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn2/gpo.htm. 
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Weber, Jenseits and Fritsche (1999)105 compare bottom up and top down analysis at the 
example of non ferro metals and calculate approximately 50% higher emissions using the 
bottom up approach GEMIS then the top down approach based on the German input output 
table. Discrepancies are attributed to different assumptions about electricity generation mix, 
heat production and possible differences in the definitions of which products to attributed to 
the class  
4.2 Border-tax level production or product specific? 
Typically several production processes and technologies are available to produce identical final 
products. For production within the region that applies border adjustment taxes in theory labeling 
could be applied to determine which processes and therefore which quantity of CO2 emissions to 
reimburse. Apart from the large administrative burden both within the firm and with the controlling 
agency, such an approach would not have the required incentive properties. Products associated with 
high CO2 emission levels would be exported, because they receive higher border-tax adjustment. This 
is likely to result in additional transport requirements within the region. Usually transport costs serve 
as an incentive for companies to buy their product from a nearby plant if two plants offer identical 
products. If border tax adjustment levels differ for two identical products because of the different 
underlying production process, then the company might buy the product from the distant plant if the 
nearby plant has higher CO2 emissions and therefore benefits more from exporting its product. 
Furthermore, production process specific adjustment levels would remove the incentive for companies 
to improve or shift the process towards more energy efficiency, because after adjusting the process 
companies would receive less border-tax adjustment when exporting their product.  
 
To use production process specific tax levels for imports into the area with border-tax adjustment 
seems also difficult. It would require monitoring of production processes outside of the jurisdiction 
and it might be more difficult to defend in the context of WTO law, because it builds on a more 
narrow definition of ‘like products’. Production processes specific adjustment levels on imports would 
seem to provide appropriate economic signals. A company deciding to use a lower CO2 intensive 
production process will benefit from lower border tax adjustment levels when exporting to the area, 
which applies border-tax adjustments. 
 
To illustrate these difficulties, we assess the situation of aluminum trade between a region A, which 
applies CO2 emission certificate requirements and corresponding border tax adjustments and the rest 
of the world B.  Aluminum produced with old, CO2 intensive processes, in region A will be exported 
                                                 
105
 Weber, F., Jenseits W. and Fritsch, U. „Bestimmung des Kummulierten Energieaufwands (KEA) durch Input-
Output- und Prozessketten-Analyse am Beispiel des Sektors NE-Metalle“, Working Paper, Oeko-Institut, Mai 
1999 
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to the world market such that the high expenditures on CO2 emissions are reimbursed. Only aluminum 
produced with new, CO2 efficient, processes would be sold within region A. To satisfy aluminum 
demand in region A, aluminum produced in the world market with CO2 efficient processes would be 
transported to region A and only face the low border tax adjustment rate. Companies are willing to 
incur the costs for the additional transport, as long as they do not exceed the difference between the 
border tax adjustment level for production processes with low CO2 and high CO2 emissions. 
Effectively region A will import from the world market aluminum produced with low CO2 emissions 
and export aluminum produced with high CO2 emissions. If aluminum production with low CO2 
emissions in region A and B (the world) suffices to satisfy demand in region A, then aluminum prices 
will stay identical for both types. The only impact of the policy will be additional aluminum 
transports. The only financial incentive in A to shift from high to low CO2 intensive production is due 
to the price differentials caused by costs of exporting high CO2 intensive aluminum and importing low 
CO2 intensive CO2. This policy however only impacts prices in A, in B the policy provides for 
incentive to shift production processes.  
 
The policy would have an impact, if region A is so large that its demand for low CO2 intensive 
aluminum production exceeds world production. In this case then prices for low and high CO2 
intensive aluminum will differ on the world market and induce companies outside of region A to shift 
from high to low CO2 intensive production processes. But as soon as the world production capacity 
for energy efficient aluminum production reaches the demand of region A the prices would equalize. 
The approach does therefore not reach far.  
 
A second problem of the approach of production process specific adjustment levels is, that it 
encourages double accounting. Imagine that region A is very big such that its demand for low CO2 
intensive aluminum would create a price difference on the world market between low and high CO2 
intensive aluminum. If a region B uses a tax break scheme to induce its aluminum industry to produce 
low CO2 intensive aluminum, then the industry in region B will benefit from both schemes. Such a 
scenario seems likely, as policy development within a region is a lengthy process and coordination 
between countries difficult.106 This would benefit individual industries at the expense of public 
expenditure and public acceptance.  
 
The economic and legal arguments suggest setting the border-tax adjustment rate independent of the 
production process. Hence, it should be made product specific. 
                                                 
106
 For example, even within a region like Australia, parallel evolution of support schemes for renewable energy 
in different states and at the federal level allows companies to claim benefits for their reneable energy from 
several different institutions (Iain MacGill, Hugh Outhred and Karel Nolles1, National Emissions Trading for 
Australia: key design issues and complementary policies for promoting energy efficiency, infrastructure 
investment and innovation, ERGO draft discussion paper 0303, 2003).  
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Production processes not only differ in the amount of energy required, but also in the fuel type used. 
The largest variations are in the sector of electric energy, which can be produced at zero emissions 
from renewables or nuclear and with very high CO2 emissions from brown coal. For this reason we 
suggest to address electric energy input separately. This still leaves us with the question of which fuel 
is used to produce process heat. In some chemical processes, specific fuels types are required, 
e.g. iron production is a coal-based process. In such processes the calculation of CO2 
emissions is rather straightforward. More controversial could be processes, which are not fuel 
specific, e.g. provision of heat for drying chambers. Coal fired heat production results in 
about twice the CO2 emissions per unit heat produced than gas fired heat production. If both 
types of fuels are used in a certain process, then non-discrimination might require that the 
lower CO2 emission fuel types serve as reference. However, this should not imply that fuels 
like biomass are suggested as reference for heat production. Biomass produces close to zero 
emissions over the life cycle. However, currently biomass is not competitive in large-scale 
appliances, as can be seen by subsidies paid to plants producing electricity from biomass. The 
subsidies will be targeted such that the price of biomass equals the price of fossil fuels plus 
emission certificates. Therefore biomass producers incur the same cost increase irrespective 
of whether they use biomass or fossil fuels and should therefore be compensated for the 
higher costs when exporting. Likewise, renewable energy inputs into large scale industrial 
production processes is currently not typical. If it would occur in developing countries / non 
Annex-I countries, then it could receive financial support from Kyoto mechanisms. To avoid 
double accounting it should therefore not be considered for exemption from border 
adjustment mechanisms.  
4.3 Technology level  
A best available technology approach is not only legally warranted, it also makes economic sense. 
Domestic industry generally has an incentive to push the reference level towards a technology level 
with high emissions such that their competitiveness on the world market improves while industries 
outside the tax region will insist that border tax adjustments are not used as a means to discriminate 
against their access to the market. Hence, the process of determining the appropriate reference 
technology or technology mix can be subject to intensive lobbying and distortions of information 
supplied to the institution determining the reference level. Therefore a clearly defined process is 
crucial to allow for effective implementation. Best available technology – in contrast to the average 
technology mix – has the advantage that only one technological process has to be evaluated. In 
contrast, using a technology mix would be more complicated. In the bottom up approach all currently 
used production processes would have to be evaluated and then weighted with their contribution to 
total production. The top down approach in contrast could be easily applied, but as illustrated in 4.2, 
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seems to be rather inaccurate. The corrections necessary to improve the results would require that the 
body setting the rates receives large discretion and will therefore be subject to intensive lobbying.  
 
Apart from the economic reasons against using an average technology mix section 3.2 already 
suggested that such an approach can discriminate against some of the producers outside the area which 
applies border tax adjustment. All foreign producers with production technologies that are more CO2 
efficient than the average technology will incur higher costs than local producers with the same 
technology will incur for their CO2 emissions. If we assume that 50% of production is more and 50% 
is less efficient than the average technology, then the policy would discriminate, at varying levels, 
against up to 50% of the foreign producers. At the same time the border-tax adjustment policy in 
combination with the CO2 emission certificate costs imply that high CO2 intensive production 
processes are more expensive within the area with border tax adjustment than outside that area. This 
might be difficult to defend. The main arguments to defend the policy would be, that at the aggregated 
industry level the disadvantages for local and foreign producers are balanced.  
 
In contrast, border tax adjustment levels related to best available technology will not incur these 
difficulties. Producers using best available technology will compete on equal footing inside and 
outside the border-tax adjusted area. Foreign producers using less efficient technologies will continue 
to be better off after the application of the border-tax adjustment than local producers. Therefore, the 
policy does at this aggregate level not contain discrimination against foreign producers irrespective of 
their production process.  
However, we are still left with the question of which technology should be labeled best available 
technology. It should be a technology that is commercially viable. Otherwise foreign producers will 
cross-subsidize a super low CO2 emission plant with the sole purpose of reducing the import tax 
levels. This could be ensured by requiring a certain market share on the world markets of the products 
build with the best available technology production process.  
 
The big advantage of setting border tax adjustment levels relative to any other tax level is, that local 
and foreign industry has opposing interests in setting the level higher or lower. This contrasts with 
usual industry interactions, during which all of industry provide information with the same bias to 
reduce the tax burden. The aim of the institution setting the border-tax adjustment level is therefore to 
create a transparent process such that industry cannot block the process by disputing the final border 
tax adjustment level. Instead industry can dispute and discuss the individual components. Industry at 
the other side of the border will balance any distortions with its expertise. 
 
Basing the border-tax adjustment level on the best available technology on the world market rather 
than the home market has a second advantage. It limits the distortions on technology choice in the 
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home market. If the best available technology applied in the home market would be used as reference 
to set the border-tax adjustment level, then incumbents would delay using the new technology in order 
to keep the border-tax adjustment they receive at a high level.  
 
An issue we still have not addressed so far is, how to treat new production processes that are more, 
rather than less, energy intensive. The additional energy intensity could be caused by higher 
environmental standards, which reduce non-CO2 emissions, but require additional energy and cause 
additional CO2 emissions. If the shifts are between different gases that contribute to climate change 
the issue can and will be easily addressed by using CO2 equivalent emissions rather than CO2 
emissions as basis for the border-tax adjustment.107 If the higher energy requirements are due to e.g. 
lower operation temperatures required to reduce NOx, then they will disadvantage producers that are 
exposed to the emission restrictions. This implies that best available technology reference production 
process should achieve the environmental standards required within the area in which the border tax 
adjustment is applied. Such a measure could induce the industry of the region that applies border tax 
adjustment to require higher environmental standards on a specific emission group to exclude a low 
CO2 intensive production process. However, such behavior is typically identified, if the purpose of 
excluding foreign products is apparent.  
 
 
Figure 2 Energy intensity of Developed Countries (Source OECD 2002)108 
                                                 
107
 The CO2 equivalent emissions for the non-electric input in the cases presented in a study are between 7% 
(rubber) and 22% (aluminum) higher than CO2 emission. These differences imply, that a consistent treatment is 
required and has to be decided on ex-ante.  (Probas, Prognos/EWI 1999, Oeko-Institute, ETH 1995) 
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 Statistic for Annex 1 Countries, TPES = Total Primary Energy Supply, Source: CO2 emissions from Fuel 
Combustion 1971-2000, International Energy Agency 2002 
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The second reason why a new production process could be more CO2 intensive, is that it resulted in 
the shift of the input factors, e.g. from labor to energy. Fortunately production of basic materials, 
which constitutes the high-energy intensive aspects, is increasingly energy efficient with the scale of 
the production process. Figure 2 shows that energy intensity of GDP is decreasing in Annex I 
countries.109  
Summarising, we would suggest using best available technology to determine the border tax 
adjustment levels, because it seems easiest to implement and compliance with WTO rules 
seems certain. Because of opposing interests of home and foreign industries the institution 
setting the level border-tax adjustment should have access to all required information such 
that a high level of accuracy of the decisions can be expected. 
 
The level has to be set ex-ante, because otherwise trade will be severely damaged if traders 
face uncertainty about the border adjustment taxes. This is particularly the case, because 
commodity traders between stable economies typically operate on small margins, such that 
already small changes of the border adjustment tax can exceed this margin and ruin the 
traders.  
4.4 Size of processed materials class 
The question not addressed so far is, how far the component 
materials have to be differentiated when border-tax 
adjustment is applied. At the outset we described that each 
product would be delivered with a label, which specifies the 
processed materials that entered into the product. However, 
as discussed in 4.3, the energy level would not be the energy 
level of the used production process but of the reference 
process using best available technology. How many product 
categories and therefore reference processes do we need to 
define?  
 
The following three reasons are in favor of large processed materials classes. First, the more processed 
materials classes we define, the larger will be the administrative burden both for industry and state to 
define the energy intensity of the reference processed materials and the smaller will be the incentive 
for industry to support the process with information. Second, the more processed materials classes we 
define, the more difficult will it be for companies to classify a product they export correctly and for the 
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 The aggregated graph could also represent shifts between sectors, therefore a more accurate representation 
should consider the evolution of energy intensity of specific industry sectors. 
Product 
 
Probas 
CO2/Kg 
Al99 I 8,45 
AlCuMg1 8,36 
AlCuMgPb 8,45 
AlCuSiMg 8,35 
AlMg 8,54 
AlMgSi 9,55 
AlMn 8,4 
AlZnCuMg 8,28 
AlSiMgMn 8,43 
Figure 3 CO2 Intensity of production 
of variations of Aluminum Aloids 
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customs authority to verify the classification. Given that customs authorities rely on the self-
declaration of companies, which can only occasionally be verified, the companies only face a 
sufficient incentive to truthfully classify their product, if misspecifications can be punished. However, 
if the specification is too difficult, then the company can dispute intentional misspecification, 
punishment is not possible and therefore enforcement 
fails. Third, the bigger a processed good class, the more 
companies will be competing in the class and the more 
likely it is that any one company will use a new, less 
CO2 intensive, technology. Given that others are likely 
to use a new, less CO2 intensive, technology, any one 
firm has less incentive to postpone applying a new 
technology.   Figure 3 illustrates that for aluminum 
aloids a subdivision seems can be avoided, as they 
exhibit similar energy intensities.  
On the other hand, the disadvantage of large product 
classes is, that CO2 intensity of the production can vary 
largely, as within the class of plastics (Figure 4). 
Within the class we will face the difficulty to determine 
which product to use to determine the CO2 (equivalent) 
emission per unit (weight) produced. The choice should 
be such, that no one has reason to suspect the intention 
of the project is a discriminate against foreign 
producer. The chosen product should therefore be 
among the products with the lowest CO2 (equivalent) 
emission in the class. This implies that the more 
divergent the CO2 intensity of the production of different products within a class, the lower the 
proportion of CO2 emission certificate costs that can be adjusted for at the border. This is the main 
driver for subdividing classes with inhomogeneous energy intensity of materials and increasing the 
number of product classes. 
4.5 Electric Energy input 
Certainly the most difficult energy input factor is electric energy. Electric energy is a freely 
tradable and homogeneous commodity. In integrated electricity systems it is technically 
impossible to identify the origin of an electric energy delivery. Therefore we propose a distinct 
treatment for electricity inputs. For electric energy input, we suggest to directly compensate for the 
price change of electricity rather than for the emission certificates required to match the average fuel 
 
Plastics 
Probas 
CO2/Kg 
EPS 3,94 
HDPE 2,51 
HDPE-APME 99 1,88 
LDPE 2,76 
LDPE-APME 99 2,08 
PP 3,67 
PS 3,12 
PS-APME 99 2,77 
PS-ISI 2,75 
PET 3,43 
PVC 2,41 
PVC-APME-99 2,12 
PVC-ISI 2,56 
PUR rigid expanded 5,38 
PUR flexible foam 6,40 
epoxy resin 6,33 
waterproof layer HDPE 2,34 
damp-proof layer HDPE 3,20 
damp-proof layer LDPE 
- flame retarded 3,96 
plastic generic 1,72 
Figure 4 CO2 Intensity of production 
of different plastics 
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mix. All databases used for our analysis allow to segregate between electric energy input and other 
input, as illustrated for GEMIS in Figure 1. 
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Figure 5 Change of marginal generation costs after introduction of CO2 emission 
certificates.110 
 
Calculation of the price change requires a dispatch model, which is a standard and transparent tool. In 
this model generators are represented with their marginal cost curve. For a given demand curve the 
intercept with the marginal cost curve determines the competitive electricity price. In Figure 5 the 
marginal costs are depicted for different generation technologies. Because different technologies face 
different cost increases due to CO2 emission certificates the ranking in which they are operated can 
shift due to CO2 emission certificates. For example, gas combined cycle turbines are in the example 
more expensive to operate than coal stations in a situation without CO2 emission certificates. 
Therefore in a world without CO2 emission certificates coal would be at the margin in times with low 
demand and set electricity prices in these periods. If CO2 emission certificates are introduced, they 
increase the coal generation costs more than gas generation costs such that gas generation is now 
cheaper and can end up at the margin, setting the electricity price. If this is the case, then the price 
difference between coal without CO2 emission certificates and gas with CO2 emission certificates 
would be the price increase of electricity which will be used to set the level of border taxes. As 
electricity demand and generation varies throughout the year the average over several periods has to be 
calculated to obtain the correct value. 
 
The observed price will always differ a little from such model approaches, mainly because of the 
exercise of market power which induces generators to bid their generators at higher costs into the 
market. However, the size of the margin is not expected to vary systematically between cases with and 
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 Source: ICF Consulting estimation for Europe, 2002, assuming a price of 40 Euro/t CO2. 
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without CO2 emission certificates and therefore can be ignored.111 More interesting are inter-temporal 
constraints – most generators cannot alter their generation output rapidly. These ramping constraints 
can be included in the models and might influence the results, because CO2 emission certificates can 
alter which generation technology is at the margin and for example shift gas powered station to 
become base load providers and shift coal stations towards the margin. Coal fired power stations are 
less flexible to adapt to varying electricity demand than gas turbines and therefore adjustment to 
varying demand can be more costly with CO2 emission certificates, a systematic bias which should 
potentially be considered by appropriate modeling techniques. 
 
An alternative approach would be to make an assumption about the energy mix used for the produced 
electricity, translate the energy input from fossil fuels into CO2 emissions, and add these to the total 
emissions per kg final product. However, this approach crucially depends on the generation mix. If 
products are produces in Norway one could argue that most power is hydro power, and therefore 
products should not receive border tax adjustment for their electric energy input. However, due to 
international electricity trade and due to limited Norwegian hydro resources CO2 emission certificates 
will also increase the Norwegian electricity price, even so most of the base load still faces the same 
marginal generation costs. This is a problem to be addressed in the context of allocation of emission 
certificates, but does not involve industry that buys the final product, electricity, at an increased price. 
Likewise, the approach to translate the fuel mix used for electricity to include the CO2 emissions into 
the CO2 balance of the product faces difficulties when used to calculate the import tariff. Countries 
like Canada or Argentina with large components of hydro could claim, that their products are 
produced environmentally friendly and should therefore not be exposed to the import tariff, However, 
even in those countries the marginal electric energy is produced with fossil generation. Therefore any 
change in industry output will first result in a change of power production from fossil fuels. 
Nevertheless, if financial incentives are strong enough, industrial plants could build a dedicated power 
line to a non-fossil generation plant to claim that they only use and are the only user of this energy. 
Hence it could be difficult to defend any fuel mix for electricity with positive contributions of fossil 
fuels when determining the border adjustment tariff for products. In contrast, by interpreting electricity 
generation as an aggregate input into the industrial production process, the CO2 emission certificates 
can be interpreted as a tax on electric energy. This tax will be compensated for, irrespective of the 
underlying evolution in the electricity industry. 
4.6 Implications of grandfathering 
We hold the view that border tax adjustment may only be applied so far as CO2 emission certificates 
are sold/auctioned rather than allocated for free. In contrast to this, free allocation in the form of pure 
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 Analysis of California experience showed, that high scarcity of NOx emission certificates created high prices 
and possibly reduced output from controlled generation. However, the larger area affected by CO2 emission 
certificates plus banking options should reduce the risk of large price spikes on CO2 emission certificates which 
could affect the impacts on the exercise of market power.  
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grandfathering could also be seen as an isolated lump sum transfer independent of the subsequent 
emission schemes, aimed at compensating industry for the changes in their home market. As such it 
could then be complemented with border tax adjustment. However, it seems more likely that the free 
allocation of emission certificates is perceived as an integrated component of the overall emission 
trading and border tax adjustment scheme. As such it would reduce the average costs industry incurs 
due to the overall scheme. Industry is only exposed to a limited cost component, which would greatly 
reduce the scope for border tax adjustment. 
 
 
Therefore, the period after 2012, when the obligation to allocate at least 90% of all allowances free of 
charge112 expires, seems more promising. For two reasons, the discussion of this period should start 
much earlier though. First, investment in low carbon technology is facilitated when more information 
about future policy tools reduces uncertainty. Second, most currently discussed allocation mechanisms 
are not purely grandfathering based on past emission levels, but also contain some relation to current 
emission levels to reduce anticipated discrimination against new entrants. If however current or future 
emission levels influence the future allocation quota, then allocation of emission certificates distorts 
production decisions. This can only be avoided by eliminating such updating procedures from future 
policies and from the anticipation of industry decision makers.  
 
Border tax adjustment can play a crucial role in this process. Given that industry benefits from lump 
sum transfers implied by free allocation of emission certificates, industry uses strong lobbying against 
any auction mechanism for emission certificates. The main economic argument against auctions of 
emission certificates is the potential reduction of international competitiveness and the implied job 
losses. This argument can be eliminated if border tax adjustment is implemented. It is likely that 
higher CO2 emission certificate prices will materialize if growing scientific evidence about climate 
change requires further reduction of CO2 emissions. These high prices are less damaging both for 
economic and social reasons, if the corresponding revenue is recovered by the state in auctions and can 
be used to compensate for the higher costs by reductions in other tax components. If emission 
certificates will continue to be allocated for free, then the resulting lump sum transfer to owners of 
large CO2 emitters will severely reduce competitiveness of European economy with bad social 
implications (for further discussion see Zhang and Baranzini 2003). Furthermore, economic efficiency 
is increased and transaction costs will be drastically reduced if CO2 emission certificates are required 
further upstream – at the fuel import level rather than at the different facility level. Such an approach is 
currently avoided, because it does not allow exemptions for energy intensive sectors that should not be 
exposed to undue disadvantage in the international competition. If such exemptions are no longer 
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 Art. 10 Directive 2003/83/EC. For the period before that, the directive even stipulates a quota of 95 percent.  
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required because border adjustment taxes create a levy playing field, then CO2 emission certificates 
can be applied upstream. 
We therefore have a mutual reinforcing policy mix of auctioning of emission certificates and border 
tax adjustment.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper has demonstrated that border tax adjustments for the emissions trading scheme 
makes economic sense. They are in conformity with WTO law where the adjustment level 
does not exceed the upper bound of the amount payable for production in the European Union 
with best available technology. To be implementable, the scheme needs to be sufficiently 
practicable. To achieve this, we propose a processed-materials approach where these are in 
turn evaluated at best available technology. Electricity, being a homogeneous commodity, 
should receive a different treatment. Adjustment in that case should follow the price increase 
induced by Carbon Emission Certificates relative to a situation without such emission 
certificates.  
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Appendix  
In the following calculations we assume that demand in two regions EA,  is described by 
differentiable demand functions )(),( PDPD EA .  Several technologies are available to produce the 
same product. The technologies differ in the amount of energy ατ + that is required for the 
production of one unit of output, with τ  fixed and 0≥α technology specific. The quantity of 
installed production capacity )( αα ′≤  with energy efficiency equal to or higher than α ′ in each 
region is characterized by the supply functions )(),( αα ′′ EA QQ . To simplify the subsequent 
calculations we assume Q  is differentiable. This can be either interpreted as an approximation in the 
limit of many firms or as any one production plant being represented by an interval of different sα , 
e.g. increasing output changes energy input. The marginal costs C  of technology α are composed of 
the basic energy costs 0C  and the additional costs for emission certificates or carbon tax CC :113 
))(()( 0 CCCC ++= ατα        (1) 
As a reference case we first assume global implementation of CO2 emission certificates. Global 
demand equals global supply, and the global marginal technology Gα is defined such that global price 
GP equals marginal costs (1): 
)))((()))((()()( 00 CGECGAGEGA CCDCCDQQ +++++=+ αταταα  (2) 
To determine the change of the marginal technology with changes of emission costs we differentiate 
(2) with respect to CC with :0,0 <′>′ DQ  
0)( <+−
+
=
∂
∂
′+′
′+′
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QQ
G
c
G
CCC
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EA
ατα
.            (3) 
With increasing costs of emission certificates a smaller set of technologies is applied, and therefore the 
global price is increasing (using (3)): 
0)(
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QQ
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C
C
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EA
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.      (4) 
In a second step we assume that emission certificates are only implemented in region E  while costless 
global arbitrage in the product market continues. Therefore marginal technologies APα and 
E
Pα differ in 
both regions to ensure the competitive price stays uniform: 
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 Note that we assume that all energy input will correspond to the same amount of carbon emissions. First, this 
requires a separate treatment of electric energy input (as suggested in the paper) to take into account the 
different generation mix of coal, gas, nuclear and renewable plants, which corresponds to different CO2 
emissions. Secondly, some production processes can be operated with different energy inputs (e.g. steel 
production with coal or electricity), and therefore additional (discrete) shifting would have to be represented, 
but should not affect the final outcome significantly. 
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00 )())(( CCCP APCEP ατατ +=++= .       (5) 
Expressing APα as function of 
E
Pα the equality of supply and demand implies: 
)))((()))((()()( 00
00
0
C
E
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E
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E
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CCE
PA CCDCCDQC
C
C
CCQ +++++=+++ ατατατα   (6) 
In this case the change of EPα  with CC  is given by: 
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Comparing the change of the marginal technology (3) with (7) shows that 
C
E
P
C
G
CC ∂
∂
∂
∂ >> αα0 if 
)(0 EAEA DDCQQ ′+′>′+′ .The condition is always satisfied as 0>′Q and 0<′D , therefore we can 
conclude: 
 
Proposition 1: With partial implementation, production in region E  is weakly more reduced than 
with full implementation of CO2 emission certificates. 
 
To assess the impact of partial implementation on output in region A we differentiate we use (5) to 
express APα as function of 
E
Pα  and differentiate with respect to CC  and substitute (7): 
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The result can be summarised: 
 
Proposition 2: With partial implementation output in region A  increases relative to no 
implementation. 
 
Finally we want to assess the impact on prices. Differentiating (5) with respect to CC , gives: 
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Comparing with (4) shows 
C
P
C
G
C
P
C
P
∂
∂
∂
∂ > : 
 
Proposition 3: With partial implementation the global product price increases, but by less than with 
full implementation. 
 
Now we assume border taxes t  are set at the level of the best available technology: CCt τ= . 
Importers into region E  have to pay t  per unit of good, and exporters receive a reimbursement for the 
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higher energy costs of t . Therefore the product price levels will be tPP AT
E
T += . This defines the 
relationship between the equilibrium technologies ETα and 
A
Tα  in both regions: 
( ) ATCCET C αα =+ 01 .          (9) 
Using again the market clearing condition that demand equals supply: 
 ( ) )))((())(()()1( 000 CETECETAETECCETA CCDCCDQQ C ++++=+−+ αταατα ,  
and differentiating with respect to CC  gives: 
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Comparing (10) with (3) and (7) we obtain 0<< ∂∂∂∂ C
E
T
C
E
P
CC
αα
.  This implies that producers in region 
E are better of with border tax adjustment. The effect on producers in region A  can be determined by 
differentiating (9) with respect to CC  and substituting from (10): 
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If 0>∂
∂
C
A
T
C
α
, then implementation of CO2 emission certificates with border adjustment taxes in region 
E will increase production in region A . 
 
Proposition 4: Producers in region A will benefit from the introduction of CO2 emission certificates 
with border adjustment taxes in region E if: 
E
T
EG
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∂
−
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α
.          (12) 
This is the case if the supply is more responsive to price changes than demand or if the dispersion of 
energy efficiency of different technologies Gα is big, relative to the basic energy demand τ . 
 
If technologies are not uniformly distributed and EQ′ is not constant or demand is not linear and ED′  
not constant, then (12) is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition. The necessary condition is 
CC
PC dCt
C
E
TC∫ ∂
∂< 0 . If the necessary condition is not satisfied, then partial implementation of CO2 
emission certificates with border-tax adjustment at the level of best available technology will result in 
a reduction of production in region A . 
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The interesting question then is, whether CO2 emission certificates with border tax adjustment affects 
production in region A  more than production in region E . This is usually not the case. Comparing the 
output change in region E  (10) with the output change in region A (11) it can be easily shown that: 
 
Proposition 5: Implementation of CO2 emission certificates with border adjustment taxes affects 
home producers more than foreign producers )0(<< ∂∂∂∂ C
A
T
C
E
T
CC
αα
 if 
)()()( 0 ECEAETEAET DCDDCQQ ′−>′−′−+′+′ ταα .  
This condition is certainly satisfied. It requires that (in linear approximation) global production 
)( EAET QQ ′+′α  after introduction of the CO2 emission certificates plus demand increase 
)( EA DD ′−′− from a price reduction by energy cost difference between efficient and inefficient 
producers 0C
E
Tα exceeds the reduction of demand )( ED′− from a price increase CCτ by the border 
adjustment tax. 
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